We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. $22. How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. 3. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. The NSA report is revealing. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. Gulf of Tonkin - National Security Agency Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. 17. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. 313-314. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. 5. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Hickman, Kennedy. 302-303. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. 13. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance ThoughtCo. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two Hickman, Kennedy. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. Conspiracy After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. . Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. This is another government conspiracy that's true. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. Here's why he couldn't walk away. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. It is not NSA's intention to prove or (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Congress supported the resolution with 2. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Gulf Of Tonkin The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage.
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